Sistema de comércio st-jean

Trade system st-jean
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Trade system st-jean
Na maior parte, Ile St. Jean (chamada Abegwet pelos índios) foi ignorada pelas potências européias em 1600. Em meados dos anos 1600, a ilha fazia parte de uma subvenção a Nicolas Denys.
Quando Acadian caiu (1710), mais atenção foi dada pelos franceses a Cape Breton (renomeada Ile Royale). A idéia de usar Ile St. Jean para fornecer Ile Royale não veio por anos, e quando o fez foi solicitado pelos Acadians e Ile Royale em si. Logo após a queda de Port Royal, alguns acadianos se aventuraram na Ilha St. Jean. A costa leste da ilha (6 léguas de profundidade) havia sido concedida a Ir. De Louvigny, Major de Quebec, em 1710. Ele precisava (em 1711, decreto real) para acomodar as pessoas lá dentro de um ano. Os acadianos não queriam estar em um sistema feudal, mas eles se estabeleceram e cultivaram trigo & amp; ervilhas (culturas típicas da Acadiana) e pescadas. Assim que os franceses assumiram o controle de Ile Royale, um engenheiro (de Couagne) escreveu ao ministro sobre o uso de Ile St. Jean. Pediu permissão para explorá-lo, pois tinha bons portos, bacalhau, terra e boa madeira que poderiam ser úteis. [Harvey, p. 30-32]
O rei da França queria que os acadianos se mudassem para Ile Royale. Alguns acadianos se mudaram, mas a maioria permaneceu. Ou eles não gostavam da terra ou esperavam manter suas terras e viver em paz. O ministro pediu às autoridades que tentem fazer com que os acadianos se mudem para Ile Royale em vez de Ile St. Jean. Quando os oficiais do Ile Royale não conseguiram trazer os acadianos, Ile St. Jean parecia mais promissora.
Os acadianos na Ile St. Jean pediram a de Louvigny a concessão de terras. Em maio de 1716, a França revogou a concessão de 1710 e tornou o domínio real de Ile St. Jean novamente. Mas era tarde demais, pois o governador em Annapolis (Caulfield) escreveu em 16 de maio de 1716, que o povo de Annapolis que se instalara na ilha St. Jean o abandonara. Aparentemente, os acadianos amam a terra deles mais do que o amor pela França ou o medo dos ingleses. Talvez a França devesse ter permitido que os acadianos acabassem de se tornar sujeitos ingleses. Em 1717, Comte de St. Pierre ofereceu um plano para reassentar os acadianos em Ile St. Jean. Antes de 1719, não havia assentamento permanente em Ile St. Jean. O conde de St. Pierre recebeu uma concessão de Ile St. Jean, Miscou e ilhas vizinhas em agosto de 1719. Gautier, Nicolas e outros ofereceram ao conde 10% dos negócios por sua influência,
mas ele se virou e conseguiu a concessão inteira. [Harvey, p. 36-40]
A maioria dos colonos de 1720-21 era da França. Embora tenha sido dada permissão em 1720 para os acadianos irem a Ile St. Jean, parece que sua preferência pela ilha era uma desculpa para não ir a Ile Royale. St. Ovide soube em novembro de 1720 que os acadianos tinham ido à ilha para inspecioná-la e descobriram que a terra estava vermelha e seca, mais pobre do que esperavam.
Não houve virtualmente nenhuma imigração para a Ilha St. Jean no final da década de 1720. O censo de 1730 encontrou menos de 300 pessoas. St. Ovide sugeriu que os jovens acadianos pudessem se mudar para lá para conseguir terras, já que a população nos pântanos acadianos estava cheia de gente. Além disso, eles estariam mais longe do controle da Inglaterra e estariam ajudando a França produzindo mercadorias para Ile Royale. Um missionário (Padre Félix, que servira aos acadianos durante 25 anos) foi trazido para a ilha em 1728, esperando atrair os acadianos. Uma guarnição foi estabelecida em Port La Joye. Eles logo receberam cerca de 100 colonos acadianos. Até o final do ano, os registros mostram 54 casas, 76 homens, 51 mulheres, 156 crianças, 14 domésticas (297 no total). Havia assentamentos em Tranche Montagne, Tracadie, St. Peters e Port La Joye (16 famílias da França, 4 da Acadia). com 1100 pessoas no total. [Harvey, p. 47-64] O pó foi armazenado em Port La Joye. Os índios vinham lá uma vez por ano para pegar pó. Micmacs se reunia uma vez por ano para os franceses lhes darem presentes. Eles se banqueteavam e recebiam pó para caçar (e para a guerra). [Harvey, p. 71]
Uma boa safra veio em 1730, o que fez com que os colonos limpassem mais terras. O rendimento atraiu a atenção dos acadianos, e 60 acadios de Beaubassin vieram examinar a terra. O censo de 1730 mostrou 76 homens, 55 mulheres, 182 crianças, 12 domésticas (325 no total). St. Peters foi o mais "densamente resolvido". área, principalmente com pescadores. Três rios foi um assentamento distinto com uma história separada. A população da ilha realmente não aumentou até 1750, quando os acadianos vieram após a fundação de Halifax. De Pensens exortou a França a deixar 1-2 soldados por ano se estabelecer lá e pagá-los por 3 anos; já que seriam melhores colonos que os acadianos que eram "naturalmente preguiçosos e acostumados a trabalhar apenas em pântanos fáceis". E as terras da ilha eram altas e difíceis de limpar. [Harvey, p. 65-70]
No início da década de 1730, os ciganos construíram várias estruturas em Three Rivers. Eles foram feitos hermeticamente por musgo e argila. As chaminés eram feitas de barro, que eram mantidas dia e noite durante sete meses do ano. Uma geladeira foi feita (para manter a comida preservada) e 2 poços (e equipados com 4 bombas) foram cavados para fornecer água. Havia um forno para assar pão. Uma enorme adega foi construída, com uma entrada em cada extremidade, para armazenar frutas. Várias alavancas foram feitas para limpar a terra. Ele construiu estradas para Cardigan, Sturgeon Rier, Souris e St. Peters. Mas tudo começou a cair quando, em 20 de junho de 1745, os habitantes da Nova Inglaterra vieram de Louisbourg, saquearam as mercadorias e incendiaram os edifícios. [Harvey, p. 85-91]
O governador de Ile Royale prometeu pagar a transferência de acadianos para a ilha St. Jean (já que ele também poderia ser indicado como governador) e pediu um navio para fazê-lo. Sem contar os pescadores, o censo de 1734 mostrou 396 pessoas e havia 432 no ano seguinte. O censo de 1734 diz que eles vieram de: Espanha (4), Canadá (16), Acadia (162) e França (214). O censo de 1735 mostra: Espanha (3), Canadá (15), Acadia (198) e França (216). [Harvey, p. 94-98]
A imigração francesa havia parado em meados da década de 1730. Evidentemente, os acadianos também trouxeram gado com eles. Edifícios foram construídos em 1735 para o cirurgião, capelão e depósito em pó. Em 1741, cinco famílias acadianas imigraram para a ilha e se estabeleceram em Malpeque. Em 1743, 8 famílias acadianas (entre 50 e 60 pessoas) se estabeleceram em Malpeque, em vez de em Three Rivers, onde teriam que pagar aluguel ao seigneur. 1744 foi o terceiro ano adequado consecutivo. Mais acadianos estavam vindo. Acadians mais jovens que haviam explorado a área primeiro. [Harvey, p. 99-107]
De Ramezay de Quebec fez ataques contra os ingleses nas Maritimas, mas basicamente as coisas foram bastante durante o período inglês de Ile St. Jean. Embora Shirley tenha dito em 1747 que 150 acádicos ajudaram De Ramezay em seu ataque à Noble no Grand Pre.
A Guerra da Sucessão Austríaca terminou com o Tratado de Aix-la-Chapelle em 18 de outubro de 1748. Ile Royale e Ile St. Jean foram devolvidos à França. [Harvey, p.109-121]
Acadians foram prometidos assistência liberal pelo governo. se os acadianos se mudassem para a ilha com o gado. Em 3 de julho de 1749, Louisbourg foi oficialmente entregue aos franceses. O forte francês de Louisbourg seria contrabalançado por um forte construído na baía de Chebucto. Halifax foi fundada em Chebucto Bay no verão de 1749.
Cornwallis escreveu uma nota aos Senhores do Comércio em 11 de setembro de 1749, à qual eles responderam em 16 de fevereiro de 1750. Ele observa que algo (por Micmacs e Id. St. Johns Indianos, liderado pelo padre francês LeLoutre) foi fabricação de cerveja. Ele afirma que os franceses estavam tentando incitar os índios contra eles. Se há alguma prova de que os acadianos forneceram armas indianas ou francesas, isso justificaria o total desarmamento deles. Os franceses não estavam apenas tentando convencer os acadianos a irem a Ile Royale e Ile St. Jean, mas também a outras áreas de New Brunswick que eram francesas. Ile St. Jean precisava ser construído para fornecer Ile Royale. Então os missionários (como Le Loutre) tinham ordens do topo. Le Loutre achava que "os interesses do Estado e da religião" nós somos um. Foi Le Loutre quem realmente iniciou a grande desordem forçando os acadianos no Istmo do Chigneto para o solo francês. [Harvey, p. 128-131]
O capitão de Bonnaventure foi nomeado comandante da Ile St. Jean em agosto de 1749. Ele deveria restabelecer a capital. No inverno, ele havia construído um prédio de escritórios para si, uma guarita, um quartel de comandante, revista de farinha, quartéis, bairros subalternos, revista de produtos secos, padaria, estábulos, forjas, quartos de capitães, revistas de melaço, bairros de cirurgiões, capelães. , cofre em pó e prisão. Eles eram feitos de madeira, mas custavam mais do que deveriam. [Harvey, p. 132]
Devido à pressão de missionários e autoridades francesas, os imigrantes mudaram-se para a ilha St. Jean de 1749 a 1751. O primeiro veio de Beaubassin. Todos os acadianos nessa área se mudaram para o solo francês nesses três anos. alguns no lado francês do istmo, alguns na ilha. Ele afirma em uma nota de 15 de agosto de 1749 que 7-8 famílias acadianas (50-60 pessoas) se mudaram para Port La Joye de Beaubassin. Eles receberam provisões, mas era difícil encontrar um lugar para eles. Se os latifundiários mais antigos se opusessem, os novos teriam que pagar impostos e aluguéis em escala no Canadá. [Harvey, p. 133]
Em 25 de abril de 1750, Le Loutre conseguiu que os índios queimassem 300 casas em Beaubassin. Ele mesmo colocou a igreja em chamas. Em 27 de abril, a imigração através de Baie Verte começou. Em julho, 200 haviam atravessado; e em novembro, mais de 800. De Bonnaventure escreveu em 22 de julho que "os acadianos vêm com a precipitação trazendo consigo suas feras". Cinco ou seis barcos foram usados. Dois deles vieram do Quebec para levar suprimentos para os canadenses no istmo. Os índios ajudaram com o movimento. "Alguns dos refugiados estavam nus tendo que escapar com os braços nas mãos".
Os ingleses não se incomodaram com o movimento de 1749, mas enviaram tropas para Beaubassin em 1750, onde o Ft. Lawrence estava sendo construído e cruzadores para a área. Isso criou ansiedade para a situação já tensa. Um barco (Le Loudon) carregando despachos e alguns acadianos foi capturado. Os planos de Le Loutre estavam entre os jornais. Uma das anotações dizia que 100 famílias de Cobequid gostariam de ir à ilha. Outro por uma Doucette disse que se a França não iria recuperar Acadia, ele queria trazer sua família para o Canadá. havia "um estado miserável, pois somos como os selvagens nas florestas". Outro barco (St. Francois) também foi levado. [Harvey, p. 137-138]
Bonnaventure tinha 1000 novos colonos, a maioria dos quais deveria estar em Kings & rsquo; rações. Para promover a agricultura, eles foram proibidos de pescar. Bigot disse ao Le Loutre para prometer aos Acadianos 3 anos de assistência se eles se mudassem para a ilha, e os índios os ajudariam a se mudar. Parecia que os acadianos de Minas, Pisiquid e Cobequid estavam prontos para agir (sob ameaças de La Corne e Le Loutre), mas não havia muito movimento. A migração de 1751 foi menos da metade daquela em 1750. principalmente o estouro de Beaubassin e alguns de Pisiquid e Cobequid. Aqueles em Cobequid disseram que estavam com medo de se mover devido à vigilância dos cruzadores ingleses.
Encontramos uma carta de Augustin Doucet em Porto Lajo, em 5 de agosto de 1750, para uma madame Languedor de Quebec, como se segue. "Eu estava estabelecido em Acadie. Eu tenho quatro filhos pequenos. Eu estava vivendo contente na minha terra. Mas isso não durou muito, pois fomos obrigados a deixar todos os nossos bens e a fugir do domínio dos ingleses. O rei se obriga a nos transportar e nos manter até que recebamos notícias da França. Se Acadie não voltar aos franceses, espero levar minha pequena família comigo para o Canadá. Garanto-lhe que estamos em uma situação precária, pois somos como índios na floresta. & Quot; [Murdoch, V. 2, apêndice 14]
Em 1751, os acadianos no istmo foram informados (proclamação de la Jonquiere) de que tinham oito dias para prestar juramento ao rei francês e se alistar nas forças armadas. ou eles seriam declarados rebeldes e expulsos de suas terras. Se eles tivessem feito o juramento de inglês sobre armas, haveria pouca chance deles serem realmente chamados a fazê-lo.
Os 45 colonos que ele colocou entre Point Prime e Point a la Framboise pediram que ele fizesse uma paróquia. O padre foi lá por 15 dias, mas eles não se deram bem. Os colonos ao longo da Riviere du Nort Est também querem uma paróquia lá.
Sua dieta neste inverno tem sido principalmente pão e ervilhas. Dessberbiers mandou avisar que Prevost estava enviando carne e legumes. Sacerdotes seriam fornecidos onde os colonos poderiam apoiá-los. Ele também disse: “Eu sei que os acadianos não estão acostumados a obedecer a seus superiores. & ldquo;
O sofrimento dos acadianos que foram para a ilha (1749-1751) foi tão ruim quanto o dos acadianos após a expulsão de 1755. Em muitos casos, eles tinham menos pertences e roupas do que os deportados no Grand Pre. [Harvey, p. 139-144]
O coronel Franquet, um oficial de engenheiros enviado para supervisionar novas fortificações em Louisbourg, visitou a ilha St. Jean no final do verão de 1751 (27 de julho a 1 de setembro). Ele preparou um relatório de 40 páginas, que recomendava: 1) os 4 principais portos fossem fortificados e abastecidos com tropas, 2) mais três paróquias fossem criadas, 3) os colonos pudessem pescar, 4) um inspetor fosse enviado para colonizar terras disputas, 5) um govt. organizar-se para a ilha, separado de Ile Royale, 6) estabelecer comunicações directas entre a ilha e a França.
Ele passou por Cap a L Ours (Cape Bear) e les Isles a Bois (Ilhas Wood) e Point Prim. Ele então entrou na Grande Baía de Port Lajoie e observou que era preciso ficar no canal enquanto ia para Port La Joye, por medo dos recifes que saíam da Ilha de São Pedro e do Governador. Atravessaram a entrada estreita com Point a la Framboise à direita e Point de la Flamme à esquerda, e ao longo da costa norte, passando por Point de la Croix, de onde uma enorme cruz se elevava acima da água, e no passado Point de la Guerite, em seguida, sob o cemitério, e até o ponto oposto Marguerite (Battery Point) na costa sul, e o riacho no lado norte formado pelo pequeno riacho que corre para o mar através do vale da Fazenda Warren. Ao redor do porto havia florestas de ébano e margens vermelhas. Casas de colonos foram espalhadas ao longo dos lados do vale, enquanto os edifícios governamentais podiam ser vistos no cume. Um forte de tijolo e pedra foi planejado. Um reduto quadrado seria erguido em Point a la Framboise, e a estação de Vidette, no Point de la Flamme, reforçada. Ele então viajou até a Riviere du Nord Est. A comunicação entre os assentamentos foi feita por canoa, abraçando as margens. Não havia estradas na ilha. [Harvey, p. 146-162]
Quase não houve migração para a ilha em 1752. Os problemas ainda estavam lá. encontrar provisões para os novos colonos e encontrar terra para eles se estabelecerem. Não havia agrimensor, embora o governador continuasse pedindo um.
Sieur de La Roque foi acusado de fazer um recenseamento geral dos colonos, na ilha, nome pelo nome, homens assim como mulheres e crianças, suas respectivas idades e profissões, o número de arpentos que cada um tem de terra melhorada, o número de seus rebanhos, suas espécies, aves, etc., etc., distinguindo os bons trabalhadores daqueles que não são, e o caráter de cada indivíduo. e, finalmente, uma pesquisa geral de tudo. Ele encontrou 28 assentamentos, sempre em rios ou na costa. A população total (sem contar os militares) era 2223, com 368 famílias ou solteiros. Veja o censo completo.
Riviere du Ouest 19 famílias 109 pessoas.
Riviere du Nord 7 pessoas 44 pessoas.
Riviere du Nord Est 34 famílias 185 pessoas [lado N] 10 famílias 64 pessoas [S lado]
Riviere de Peugiguit 7 famílias 34 pessoas [lado E] 8 famílias 37 pessoas [lado W]
Riviere du Moulin um Scie 43 famílias 308 pessoas.
Anse au Comte Saint Pierre 4 famílias 31 pessoas.
Anse au Matelost 24 famílias 153 pessoas.
Grande Anse 18 famílias 95 pessoas.
Grande Ascensão 11 famílias 59 pessoas.
Pointe au Boulleau 3 famílias 14 pessoas.
Anse de la Boullotierre 1 família 11 pessoas.
Anse a Pinnet 17 famílias 110 pessoas.
Havre La Fortune 6 famílias 48 pessoas.
Pointe de l'Est 4 famílias 22 pessoas.
St. Pierre du Nord 63 famílias 353 pessoas.
Tracadie 8 famílias 64 pessoas.
Etang des Berges 2 famílias 15 pessoas.
Macpec 32 famílias 201 pessoas.
Bedec 8 famílias 42 pessoas.
La Traverse 5 famílias 23 pessoas.
Riviere des Blonds 5 famílias 37 pessoas.
Riviere au Crapeau 2 famílias 12 pessoas.
Anse du Nord Ouest 3 famílias 30 pessoas.
Anse aux Sanglier 2 famílias 10 pessoas.
Quanto ao gado, havia 98 cavalos, 1259 bovinos, 799 bois, 1230 ovinos, 1295 porcos, 2393 galinhas, 304 gansos, 90 perus e 12 patos. A mortalidade da fera deve ter sido grande. Prevost declarara em novembro de 1751 que os acadianos haviam trazido (para a ilha) 2209 bovinos, 171 cavalos, etc. Embora alguns tenham sido enviados para Louisbourg, muitos provavelmente foram comidos em anos de colheitas ruins.
Os colonos também possuíam 4 escunas (15 toneladas, 25 toneladas, 26 toneladas, 45-50 toneladas), 4 batteaux, 15 barcos de pesca e 11 pequenos barcos ou canoas. Havia 4 moinhos de farinha e 2 serrarias na ilha. Grande parte da terra não estava produzindo porque não havia sementes suficientes. A França não manteve a colônia suprida como prometido.
Riviere du Ouest.
Riviere du Nord.
Riviere du Nord Est.
Riviere de Peugiguit.
Anse du Compte St-Pierre.
Riviere du Moulin um Scie.
Anse au Matelost.
Pointe au Boulleau.
Anse de la Boullotierre.
Havre La Fortune.
St. Pierre du Nord.
Etang des Berges.
Riviere des Blonds.
Riviere au Crapeau.
Anse du Nord Ouest.
Anse aux Sanglier.
Leste ou rio de Hillsborough.
Birch Point, estendendo-se para Orwell Bay.
Newtown River flui SW em Orwell Bay.
Pinette (Pinette Bay)
Porto de São Pedro.
Stanhope (lagoa de Campbell em Grand Tracadie)
Área River de Johnston.
Nine Mile Creek.
Holland Cove, também Observation Cove.
Além disso, nos comentários de La Roque sobre Malpeque, descobrimos que houve 3 anos ruins seguidos. O primeiro ano foi atormentado por ratos de campo. Os colonos culparam a peste por um espírito maligno que era contra a ilha. Suas suspeitas recaíram sobre alguém (St. Germain dit Perigord) e os índios o mataram e o enterraram na Ilha de Comte de Saint Pierre (larboard quando você entra em Port la Joye). O segundo ano foi atormentado por toneladas de grandes gafanhotos que comiam tudo. até a grama e os botões das árvores. No terceiro ano, as culturas de trigo foram escaldadas. Nos últimos 6 meses, a maioria nem tinha pão para comer. Eles viviam de crustáceos reunidos nas margens quando a maré saía. [Harvey, 169-172]
O conde de Raymond escreveu a Bonnaventure em 4 de outubro de 1751. Bonnaventure ajudaria todos os que quisessem se mudar para a ilha e os proveriam para o primeiro ano. As estradas de Port la Joye para Three Rivers, de Three Rivers para St. Peters e de Three Rivers para East Point, deveriam ser melhoradas.
Em 1752, apenas 7-8 famílias acadianas vieram para a ilha, e mais tarde no ano 5 alemão & amp; Famílias suíças chegaram de Halifax. A safra também foi muito boa naquele ano.
As colheitas pareciam boas em 1753 até agosto, quando o trigo foi atingido pela ferrugem. Os jardins foram muito bem sucedidos. Os acadianos queriam criar cavalos, mas foram desencorajados. Os cavalos comiam mais que bois e demoravam mais para treinar e ser úteis. Assim, os colonos não poderiam ter mais de um cavalo por família.
Antes de 1752, o único padre estava em Port la Joye. Mas mais quatro vieram para Malpeque, St. Peters, Northest River e Point Prim. O ministro determinou que "2700 libras sejam desviadas dos fundos do serviço secreto para esse fim". e os colonos competiram na construção de suas igrejas. Aqueles em Point Prim (a maioria de Cobequid) tiveram seu antigo padre Girard com eles. Girard escreveu em 31 de outubro de 1753 que "a nudez é quase universal". Alguns não poderão trabalhar no inverno devido à falta de implementos. Eles não podem se proteger do frio de dia ou de noite. A maioria das crianças está tão nua que elas não podem se cobrir. Quando o padre entra em suas cabanas, eles estão sentados nas cinzas ao lado do fogo e tentam se esconder com as mãos, e "voam sem sapatos, meias ou roupas". Todos não eram tão ruins, mas a maioria está em necessidade. [Harvey, 173-179]
O edifício do Ft. Edwards e Ft. Lawrence aumentou a imigração em 1753 (400) e 1754. Em 1753, 135 deles tentaram se estabelecer em Pointe a la Jeunesse em Ile Royale, mas quase morreram de fome. Em 1753, apenas 1/3 da terra foi usada porque eles não tinham sementes suficientes. Mais acadianos teriam ido para a ilha, mas faltavam fortificações.
O censo de 1755 mostrou uma população na ilha de 2969. Mas logo as deportações ocorreram e no final de 1755 e início de 1756, 2000 os acadianos apareceram em Ile St. Jean. de Beausejour, Cocagne, Pisiquid e Cobequid. Villejouin (o sucessor de Bonnaventure) enviou os idosos e doentes para o Canadá, o que lhe deixou 1400 para lidar. Os Acadianos Cobequid se mudaram como um grupo através de Tatamagouche antes da deportação. Quando os britânicos chegaram a Cobequid, ninguém estava lá. [Harvey, 180-181]
Dos 87 que vieram de Cocagne na primavera de 1756, 16 haviam sido deportados em 1755 e desembarcados em Carolina. Eles (e outros 34) viajaram de volta para o rio St. John e depois para Cocagne. (Apenas para ser deportado novamente em 1758). Houve grande sofrimento no inverno de 1755-56. De Villejouin pediu ajuda a Louisbourg, mas havia pouco a oferecer. Alguns suprimentos também foram enviados na primavera de Drucourt e Prevost (2 navios) e de Bigot em Quebec no verão. Um dos barcos da Bigot era o Le Flora, que carregava algumas das “bocas inúteis”; para lá. Outro barco para Louisbourg (Les Deux Soeurs) foi expulso pelos ingleses e desembarcado em Ile St. Jean. [Harvey, p. 182]
Rações por família por mês foram: 20 # farinha, 10 # legumes, 12 # carne, 1 # manteiga e 1 pote de melaço. O mau tempo em agosto levou a uma colheita menor. Os colonos pediam ao comandante todos os dias para matar alguns dos 7 mil bovinos por comida para evitar a fome; mas ele viu isso como um último recurso. [Harvey, p. 183]
Uma carga foi retirada dos ingleses naquele ano (1756), e o seguinte foi enviado para a Ilha St. Jean: 1179 quintais 60 # farinha, 258 quintais de carne salgada, 133 quintais 16 # pieds e testes de cochons, 3942 potes de melaço, 100 barris de sal, 517 ells de drugget, 82 1/4 ells de pano azul claro, 176 envoltórios diversos, 100 chapéus, 2000 ells de material azul, listrado para chemises. Os índios salvaram grande parte da carga (sal, farinha) de um barco preso no gelo perto de Port la Joye. O trigo de semente foi trazido da França nas fragatas que vieram defender Louisbourg, mas as colheitas fracassaram.
Sessenta dos homens jovens foram armados e enviados para Acadian no inverno de 1756. Eles recuperaram 40 bois e alguns cavalos perto de Pisiquid. Eles também mataram 13 ingleses, feriram 4 e capturaram uma revista com 300 cabeças de trigo, 60 de farinha e banha e manteiga. Eles queimaram 2 celeiros de trigo, um moinho e uma padaria. Eles ajudaram alguns acadianos a se esconder entre Cobequid e Tatamagouche para se mudarem para a Ilha St. Jean. E eles levaram 500 bois para Louisbourg. [Harvey, p. 185]
Difusão de palavras de desenhos ingleses em Louisbourg. Alguns colonos esperavam uma visita "& rdquo; dos ingleses e não até a terra deles naquele ano (1757). Os colonos costeiros estavam armados e tinham munição. Eles foram instruídos a enviar suas mulheres e crianças para a floresta se o inimigo se aproximasse. [Harvey, p. 184]
Vaudreuil escreveu ao ministro em 18 de abril de 1757, observando que "as mulheres e as crianças não ousam deixar de ser capazes de esconder sua nudez". É o mesmo com vários homens. Havia mais de 6000 bovinos na ilha. Ele sugeriu que o rei enviasse algumas fragatas para a ilha. Ele não queria perdê-lo para os ingleses. Em uma nota de 10 de dezembro de 1757 de Prevost ao ministro, ele pediu sementes desde que as duas últimas safras foram ruins. Eles teriam morrido de fome se não tivessem capturado trigo e centeio. Eles precisavam de sementes da França para a temporada de 1758. Em 5 anos, houve apenas 1 boa colheita. A ilha raramente tinha mais do que um par de meses de ração. Eles deveriam ter matado o gado, à luz do que estava prestes a acontecer com eles. [Harvey, p. 186]
Louisbourg estava com problemas, e Villejouin levou 200 homens para ir em 1º de julho. Mas 100 tiveram que ser abandonados porque não tinham sapatos. O resto se mostrou inútil, uma vez que Louisbourg se rendeu em 26 de julho de 1758. A política da Inglaterra era agora livrar-se completamente dos franceses. Todos deveriam ser enviados para a França. [Harvey, p. 188]
Em 8 de agosto, Amherst tinha Lord Rollo & amp; Tenente Spry (engenheiro) leva 4 navios de guerra e 500 homens para Ile St. Jean. Ele deveria construir um forte. Crucour enviou dois oficiais de Louisbourg para informar os franceses a se renderem. Se eles resistissem, eles seriam mortos. Todos os habitantes deveriam ser levados para Louisbourg. [Harvey, p. 189]
Rollo chegou e começou a trabalhar no Ft. Amherst. Depois de ouvir dos oficiais franceses, os colonos não ofereceram resistência, embora muitos em assentamentos periféricos tenham escapado para Quebec e Miramichi. carregando ou destruindo tanto bens domésticos quanto gado quanto possível. Índios (150) na costa norte destruíram a propriedade para que os ingleses não a conseguissem. O capelão de Port La Joye havia escapado no dia anterior à chegada de Rollo, mas os padres no Nordeste do Rio, São Peters e Point Prim foram deportados com os colonos. O primeiro grupo de 692 foi enviado de Port La Joye. O comandante Villejouin escreveu uma nota em 8 de setembro de 1758. [Harvey, p. 190]
Fizera preparações para defender a ilha, mas com a queda de Louisbourg era desnecessário. Ele sabia que não podia aconselhar o povo a pegar em armas. Mesmo que tivesse tempo de evacuar a ilha, isso seria impossível. [Harvey, p. 191]
Miramichi era o lugar mais próximo, mas era tão carente de provisões que alguns que lá foram retornaram. melhor ser deportado do que morrer de fome. Os habitantes perguntaram a Rollo se poderiam manter suas terras. Ele encaminhou o pedido para Louisbourg, que recusou. aparentemente eles planejavam se livrar totalmente dos franceses. Embora Rollo tivesse evacuado cerca de 700 (incluindo o comandante), havia.
ainda 4000 na ilha. Ele infere que eles têm sido lentos em se entregarem devido ao tratamento dos ingleses. Já se passaram 3 anos desde que o último dos refugiados chegou à ilha. Provisões e roupas eram escassas. Houve pesadas perdas e dificuldades em chegar lá. Parece que ninguém realmente morreu de fome. [Harvey, p. 192]
Eles estão indo para a França. Ele "os viu mergulhados na miséria mais aterradora que eles já experimentaram, como eu mal posso pintar para você". Essas pessoas ficarão sem comida e roupas, incapazes de procurar alojamentos e lenha, em um mundo estranho, tímido por natureza, e não sabendo para onde voltar em sua hora de necessidade ”. Achava que os ingleses deveriam deixar alguns dos acadianos da ilha para cuidar do gado (incl. 6000 bovinos). [Harvey, p. 193]
Uma carta de Boscawen para Pitt (13 de setembro de 1758), com base nas informações de Rollo, mostra como os ingleses não sabiam muito sobre a ilha St. Jean. Ele disse que tinha mais de 10 mil cabeças de gado e muitos habitantes disseram que cultivavam 1200 alqueires de milho por ano. Quebec era o único mercado deles. Eles eram o único fornecimento de milho e carne do Quebec no Novo Mundo. Os desta ilha estão matando os habitantes ingleses para vender os seus.
escalpelos para os franceses. [Harvey, p. 194]
Eles pensaram que a ilha tinha entre 400 e 500 habitantes, mas M. Drucour disse que pode haver até 1500.
A história dos índios pagadores franceses (não acadianos) pelo couro cabeludo inglês pode ter sido verdadeira, mas as alegações de fornecer gado para o Quebec estavam todas erradas. O Gautier Acadiano (Nicolas & rsquo; filho) foi o único que foi com os índios em invasões escalpelamento. [Harvey, p. 195]
A deportação de Ile St. Jean foi devagar. Alguns estavam fugindo (com ajuda francesa) da costa norte, mas o capitão Hay encarregado dos transportes não permitia que nenhum deles fosse para lá. Em 29 de outubro, Lord Rollo relatou 1500 embarcados. Em 5 de novembro, o Almirante Durell informou que 2000 embarcou em 16 transportes e enviou navios do cartel para a França. Em 6 de novembro, Whitmore informou a Pitt que 2200 estavam embarcados, mas Rollo teve que fazê-lo.
deixe uma paróquia inteira (na parte noroeste da ilha) para trás. Rollo retornou a Louisbourg em 14 de novembro. É difícil determinar o número exato de deportado. Além do 2000 Durell disse que foram deportados antes de 5 de novembro, 7 transportes deixaram Canso em 25 de novembro liderado pelo Capitão Nicholls no duque William. [Harvey, p. 197]
Over 700 people were on the 2 largest ships . the Duke William and the Violet . Both of these ships sank as they neared England. A third ship, the Ruby , sank off Portugal and lost 190 of its 310 passengers. With the 5 smaller ones holding 600, there would be a total of 3500 deported in 1758. Of these, about 900 were drowned. In 1763, there were 2400 Acadians, primarily from the Ile St. Jean deportation, living on welfare in France. [Harvey, p. 198]
Of those who escaped the deportation, some left from the north shore and headed for Quebec on French schooners. Others fled to Miramichi, but they had no food. A Sept. 24, 1758 report from Murray to Wolfe stated that those at Miramichi were starving and preparing to go to Canada. Some found their way to St. Pierre and Miquelon; a 1767 census there shows 81 from Ile St. Jean. The parish of Malpeque and some around the Northeast River had escaped deportation. They soon become good at hiding in the woods.
When ships were sent to Isle St. Jean in spring 1759 to pick up the remaining inhabitants, the person in charge (Capt. Johnson) said they had all gone off to Canada.
A report by Gov. Wilmot (June 2, 1764) estimates 300 Acadians on the island . who declared “recently in a most solemn manner” that they would recognize no king except the King of France. In 1765, Capt. Holland stated in a letter to the Earl of Hillsborough that "there are about thirty Acadian families on the island, who are regarded as prisoners, and kept on the same footing as those at Halifax. They are extremely poor, and maintain themselves by their industry in gardening, fishing, fowling, etc. The few remaining houses in the different parts of the island are very bad, and the quantity of cattle is but very inconsiderable." [Duncan Campbell, History of PEI ]
Capt. Morris estimated 207 Acadians there in 1767. [Harvey, p. 199-200] Their descendants form a large part of the current Acadian population on the island today.
In the early 1800s, Acadians made their way to the present-day Evangeline region of PEI. Though at first they were there illegally, some managed to purchase land as the years went by. Sixty-one families (with surnames of Arsenault, Gallant, Richard, Bernard, Poirier, Cormier, and Aucoin) were there in 1828. In 1852, the government allowed Acadians to buy land in canton 15. That area continues to be occupied by Acadian descendants, though the population has spread out beyond the borders of that canton. Acadians who arrived there after 1830 often settled in cantons 14 and 16.
Over time, some of the Acadian areas lost their French nature, though it still remains in places such as Mount Carmel, Egmont Bay, and Wellington.

17 Things to Know About California’s Carbon Cap.
The Golden (State's) rules.
While Cascadian climate hawks have been fighting rearguard actions against proposed pipelines and coal trains, California has been rolling out an ambitious carbon cap. Such a cap is the principal alternative to a carbon tax—such as British Columbia’s carbon tax shift—as a method for putting a price on carbon in Oregon and Washington. It’s an option Oregon will consider next year in its impending revenue-reform debate. In Washington, the Golden State’s cap appears to be the model that Governor Jay Inslee favors: he recently convened a panel of leaders to design a state “Cap and Market” system.
The panel, after deliberation, may conclude that the best choice is for Washington to simply photocopy California’s rules and join the Golden State’s system. California actually designed its carbon market so that other states can plug themselves into it. Or the panel could opt to design its own system. Either way, Cascadia’s climate warriors would do well to study how their southern neighbor put a price on carbon, because the Golden State’s rules form the dominant carbon trading market in North America. Just last week, the state auctioned more than 20 million carbon-emission permits at $11.50 apiece.
Here are 17 things worth knowing about that market. Some of them are details, even arcane ones, but the details of a carbon pricing system matter enormously. They matter more than whether the underlying mechanism is a tax or a cap. (Sightline laid out the details of good design in Cap and Trade 101.)
1. The cap is strong . . . until 2020.
California’s carbon cap—the flagship in an armada of global warming policies launched in 2006 as Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32)—came into force in January of 2013, initially covering the electric-power sector and large factories with giant carbon footprints. Next year, it expands to the carbon dioxide from gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and other fossil fuels (and to other greenhouse gases such as methane). By then, the Cali cap will be the most comprehensive, though not the most aggressive, carbon-pricing regime in the world.
The crux of cap-and-trade is the cap itself: a legally enforceable limit on total climate-altering pollution. The cap diminishes over time, gradually squeezing carbon out of the economy.
The Air Resources Board, a branch of the California Environmental Protection Agency, designed and enforces the cap. ARB issues one permit for each ton of carbon dioxide emissions allowed each year. Once the cap is fully phased in next year, just about everyone who sells fossil fuels or fossil-fuel-powered electricity into the California economy will have to obtain enough permits to cover the emissions from their fuel or electricity.
The total supply of emissions permits will step downward by 2-3 percent per year for the rest of this decade so that emissions return to the 1990 level by 2020. After 2020, the same annual cap will likely apply, but as of yet, the legislature has not told ARB to ratchet down permits further. The state is under a non-binding executive order to reduce emissions an additional 80 percent by 2050, and the legislature has begun debating a continued downward trajectory of permits. But the program’s future depends on whether climate hawks retain sufficient influence in Sacramento.
2. Is it working? Por enquanto, tudo bem.
California’s cap is new, so it’s too soon to make unequivocal statements about its effectiveness. Complete emissions data from the Golden State are only available through 2011—two years before the launch of the cap. So far, though, ARB’s systems of rules and enforcement mechanisms seem well crafted and appear to be functioning as intended. Barring some unforeseen political change, we expect they will trim emissions as intended through 2020.
Overall, the state’s emissions (shown below) rose from 1996 to 2007, then dropped with the Great Recession and have since plateaued. To return to 1990 levels by 2020 will require a 5 percent drop below the 2011 level. Because California’s population continues growing quickly, emissions per capita will have to drop even more, as the figure shows. (Sources for the figure are at the end of the article.)
Original Sightline Institute graphic, available under our Free Use Policy.
3. Most of the dollar value of the permits will benefit the public.
The “trade” in cap-and-trade means that the companies regulated under the cap can sell their emissions permits if they have more than they need or buy permits from others if they’re short. These emissions permits are like shares of stock or commodities such as pork bellies: their value varies and you can sell them for cash.
Many cap-and-trade systems distribute emissions permits for free—an approach Sightline has long criticized as regressive and a reward to dirty industries. Sightline, like most policy analysts, prefers auctioning permits, so that the public retains their full value and can invest it in public purposes, such as buffering low-income families against higher energy prices.
Next year, when the cap expands, ARB will auction most of the new permits—those for petroleum and other fuels. That’s great news, and it will account for about half of all permits in the years ahead. As for the rest of the system—the permits covering electricity, large factories, and other sources of greenhouse gases—well, it’s complicated. But the bottom line is that, even though ARB has been distributing about 90 percent of emissions permits for free in 2013 and 2014, it’s devised policies that are hard to criticize too harshly. By our estimation, most of the dollar value associated with the permits will either be captured in the auction or be allocated in a way that provides at least indirect benefits to the public.
First, ARB is not grandfathering permits—distributing free permits to large industrial facilities based on their past emissions. Instead, it has devised a formula that provides free permits (shown in blue in the figure below) to large industrial companies whose products compete head-to-head with products from outside of California. The goal is to prevent putting California industries that sell into out-of-state markets at a disadvantage. The formula goes further and gives extra permits to the firms that have done the most to reduce their emissions. It’s not a perfect policy. It still siphons money to the state’s biggest carbon polluters, and no formula can capture all the nuances of market competition. Still, it’s not grandfathering.
Second, ARB is distributing most of its free permits to electric utilities (orange in the figure below) and, starting next year, to natural gas utilities (yellow, below). The utilities get the permits for free, but the California Public Utility Commission requires all investor-owned utilities to sell their permits in ARB’s auction. Of course, the utilities then need to buy permits to cover their own emissions. The point of this Rube Goldberg device is to determine the dollar value of the permits: the CPUC orders utilities to devote all of the proceeds from the sales of their permits for the exclusive benefit of their retail customers.
For example, the CPUC ordered Pacific Gas and Electric, the giant private utility that serves much of northern California, to give “climate credits” averaging $35 to residential customers as line items on their April bills. It will do so again in October. That’s enough money to offset the pocketbook bite of carbon pricing—the increased price of PG&E electricity—for many customers, especially low-income households. Because the credits come as a flat amount that is the same regardless of how much power a household uses, they don’t diminish the economic incentive to reduce emissions. And they counter the regressive nature of carbon pricing: poor families get the same credit as rich families, although poor families use far fewer kilowatt-hours. In effect, California has hacked together a crude cap-and-dividend system through its utilities.
Climate credits are progressive in another way as well. California offers discounted power rates and energy-saving services for qualifying low-income families, further trimming their bills. Climate credits consequently stretch further.
Original Sightline Institute graphic, available under our Free Use Policy.
4. The cap will hurt working families some, despite Cali’s best efforts.
California chose to take imperfect action and address regressivity through policies like utility credits. These credits are a blunt instrument for sharing carbon-pricing revenue. They allocate credits one per electric meter, whether the meter serves one person or eight. A better policy would distribute climate credits through refundable state income tax credits and the electronic benefit transfer system. The tax and benefit systems have the subtlety and comprehensiveness to distribute climate credits to those who need them most.
Californian climate hawks had bold plans for just such low-income rebates, one advocate told us. Unfortunately, she said, “The lawyers came in and shut down the party.” Legal and political constraints made rebates impossible. In California, new taxes must win supermajority support in the state legislature, while state agencies can impose fees authorized by simple majorities. AB 32 passed by simple majority in 2006, granting power to ARB to establish cap and trade. To defend the system against lawsuits arguing that cap and trade is an unauthorized tax, ARB must collect and spend auction revenue in conformity with legal definitions of a fee.
To qualify as a fee, a revenue stream has to pass a set of legal tests, among which is that the fee pays for programs closely aligned with the fee itself. Tax revenue can be spent on whatever the legislature chooses; fee revenue can only flow to programs that advance the purpose of the fee. A tax can pay for schools or police or state parks and anything else the legislature chooses, but a garbage-collection fee must pay for garbage collection.
In the case of cap and trade, the purpose of the program is to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, so California’s auction revenues must fund emissions-reduction programs. Distributing the proceeds as rebates to poor families or as dividends for all Californians would be to treat auction revenue as a tax. The whole cap-and-trade program might then be vulnerable to a lawsuit.
Utilities are regulated private companies, not public entities, so the closest California could come to rebates for working families was its utility hack: free permits, mandatory auctions, mandatory “climate credits.” For the poorest families, who consume little power and pay discounted rates, these credits provide a net gain: their value is far greater than costs these families will see as a result of the higher power prices associated with the carbon cap in the electricity and industrial sectors.
That’s good news, because, next year, when the auction expands to petroleum and more, household costs are likely to begin rising more and the state has only weak tools—two of them—for further buffering the poor.
First, economy-wide energy efficiency standards and investments paid for with cap revenue will help trim the energy consumption of California households. They’ll have more efficient appliances, vehicles, and homes, and, for some, energy consumption may decline more than prices rise.
Second, California has committed that at least 10 percent of auction funds will go to clean-energy and climate-protection programs in neighborhoods where disadvantaged people are disproportionately represented. It also requires that 25 percent of auction proceeds go to projects that particularly help disadvantaged communities in some way.
Project-by-project investments in building retrofits, better transit, and other green infrastructure—no matter how desirable they may be—cannot buffer all working families from the pocket-book effects of putting a price on carbon. But they’ll buffer many families.
California’s cap is distorted by the supermajority voting requirement in the state constitution. Oregon has a similar, though less extreme, supermajority rule for new revenue. Washington, however, does not. The Evergreen State may therefore be able to do better by its working families in its carbon pricing system than California does.
5. California may soon get more than $1 billion a year from its carbon auction.
Look at the olive area that dominates the chart above. That area mostly represents permits for transportation fuels. Starting next year, the state will begin auctioning these permits and placing the revenues in a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund.
How much revenue will come into the fund depends on the auction price of permits, of course, but it’s likely to exceed half a billion dollars in the next fiscal year. That figure could increase to as much as $2 billion a year for the rest of the decade or roughly $50 a year for each of the state’s 38 million residents.
The state is supposed to invest these funds in programs that reduce carbon pollution. The state’s investment plan sketches expenditures in sustainable infrastructure, energy efficiency upgrades, natural resource conservation, solid-waste reduction and recycling, and low-carbon transportation systems. Governor Jerry Brown has proposed dedicating $250 million in 2014 to the controversial high-speed rail line in development between Los Angeles and San Francisco.
Whether the Golden State will do a good job of managing its carbon auction proceeds is a great, unanswerable question. O tempo vai dizer.
6. The scope is almost comprehensive.
By the end of 2015, the Cali cap will cover 85 percent of California’s greenhouse gas emissions, including non-fossil-fuel emissions of carbon from cement manufacturing and “minor greenhouse gases” such as methane. It even includes “carbon by wire,” that is, the emissions from out-of-state coal and natural gas plants that sell electricity into the state’s grid. Following what appears to be a standard adaptation of IPCC measurement rules, however, California does not include in its emissions inventory—or in its carbon pricing policies—fuel used to power planes or ships with destinations beyond the state border.
For comparison, the BC carbon tax covers only fossil fuels burned inside the province; it does not include carbon by wire or fuel used by planes or ships leaving the province. Altogether, the BC carbon tax shift encompasses about 70 percent of provincial greenhouse gas emissions. The Northeast states’ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) covers only electricity, and not carbon by wire. The European cap-and-trade system covers electricity and industry but not motor fuels. California’s program, although its current carbon price is lower than that in British Columbia and some European carbon taxes, will soon be the most comprehensive in the world. And as the cap gets tighter it may gain depth to go along with its breadth.
7. The cap requires zero paperwork from most Californians.
Any carbon price has to actually attach to fossil fuels at specific, physical locations. ARB made life easy for itself by choosing locations that would limit the number of companies it would need to regulate: in the entire state, only an estimated 350 businesses have legal obligations under the cap. Some of these companies’ 600-or-so regulated facilities are “upstream,” such as power plants, while others are “midstream,” such as wholesale petroleum distribution centers, but all of them are convenient chokepoints in the fossil fuel economy. In short, most Californians will see the impacts of carbon pricing in their fuel bills—and in the funding it produces for clean-energy solutions and utility rebates—but they’ll never fill out of a form.
8. The cap smartly allows “banking,” not “borrowing.”
The Cali rules allow regulated entities to save permits issued this year for use in a future year (banking) but not to borrow permits from future years to use now (borrowing). California’s permits have a “vintage year” and can be used at any point during or after that year. This is good policy, as it adds flexibility for participants and stabilizes permit prices without blowing a hole in the cap.
9. Trading is tightly regulated, as it should be.
The first permit auction took place in November of 2012, and it and subsequent auctions have gone smoothly. Any individuals or entities that register can participate in the trading of permits, which is good thing for the smooth functioning of the carbon market. ARB has also introduced a variety of market monitoring efforts. For example, the state enforces limits on how many permits one may hold and disclosure rules require that the authorities know who owns each permit at any point in time. Such policies provide safeguards against market manipulation and fraud of the type recently documented in Wall Street high-frequency trading and “dark pools.” Gaming of this type is unlikely in any event, as Sightline has argued, but ARB is not taking chances.
10. California carefully restricts and monitors offsets.
California allows regulated facilities to substitute qualifying offsets—such as reforestation programs and methane captured from livestock manure digesters—for 8 percent of their emissions permits. Critics have argued that California’s offset provisions are far too generous, endangering the integrity of the cap. Early offsets in the European cap-and-trade program sometimes proved dubious as to their true net effect on global carbon pollution.
We’ll have to wait and see the effect of California’s offsets, but ARB’s regulations suggest that the agency is taking an appropriately hard line. Its offset restrictions may be the toughest in any cap-and-trade system. All offsets must be third-party verified, sited within the United States, provably “additional” to what would have otherwise happened, and from within only five categories so far. The limited availability of offsets that pass those tests may prevent offsets from meeting anywhere close to their theoretical maximum of 8 percent of permits per regulated facility.
11. California’s cap folds in the climate benefits of a carbon tax.
On May 16, ARB auctioned almost 17 million one-ton carbon permits for $11.50 each, plus another 4 million that will not be valid until 2017, for $11.34 each. Between auctions, permits trade on private markets. Their price has trended downward (see page 12) as more auctions have taken place, revealing that emissions reductions are perhaps easier to come by than previously expected. That price translates, very roughly, to 1 cent per kWh of coal-fired power or a dime per gallon of gasoline (except that gasoline doesn’t come under the cap until 2015). In comparison, the BC carbon tax started at $10 per metric ton of CO 2 in 2008 and increased to $30 per ton (US$27.50) in 2012, where it has remained.
The February auction price was just above the reserve price—the minimum bid allowed. The reserve price started at $10 per ton in 2012 and goes up annually by 5 percent plus inflation. This escalating reserve price accelerates emissions reductions if they prove inexpensive. It establishes a predictable floor beneath which the carbon price will not fall, and that price floor tells the entire energy economy that cheap carbon is forever gone, just as a carbon tax would. The inflation-adjusted price of carbon will be no lower than $15 a ton in 2020. By 2031, assuming extension of the program, the floor price will be above $25.
12. California’s “reserve” could speed the transition beyond carbon.
Some cap-and-trade systems set top prices called “pressure valves” that threaten to blow holes in the cap by allowing waivers and exemptions. California’s does not. Instead, it has a “price containment reserve” (shown in red in the figure above). ARB holds back a few percent of permits from each auction and deposits them in the reserve. If carbon prices rise across a high trigger, some of these permits go to auction, helping to tame prices. This reservoir of permits not only serves as a shock absorber against price spikes, it also tightens the cap in regular years. ARB projects that permit prices will stay below the trigger price; if that happens, the state will actually end up below 1990 levels in 2020.
13. The governor can put the cap on hold.
Less admirable about this policy is a poison pill buried in AB 32. To win passage, proponents of the bill had to include a provision that allows the governor to suspend the program for a year in case of “extraordinary circumstances, catastrophic events, or threat of significant economic harm”—terms that a science-denying future governor might exploit for political purposes. Indeed, gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman pledged to do so in her race against Jerry Brown. The governor cannot suspend the state’s income tax or speeding laws in any circumstances. Why should she or he have unilateral authority to suspend its carbon cap?
14. The cap is only part of California’s approach.
California’s carbon cap is only one facet of AB 32. It’s a critical one—the backstop and guarantor of all the others—but it’s not alone.
In fact, by some measures, the cap is not even the main event. The latest ARB estimate suggests that 80 percent of the promised emissions reductions will come from “complementary policies” such as a Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Advanced Clean Car Standards, and a Renewable Electricity Standard. The cap-and-trade program “cleans up the rest.”
Economists tend to dislike this type of complementarity. The philosophy of cap-and-trade is for the market, not public agencies, to choose how to tame carbon pollution. On the other hand, energy markets are riddled with flaws and oddities (such as payback gaps, split incentives, and other principal-agent problems), so the traditional arguments for relying entirely on market incentives are not bullet-proof. Ultimately, it’s a battle between market failure and government failure.
California’s approach—for better or worse—is to wear both belt and suspenders: put a price on carbon but also implement regulatory policies in an effort to fix market failures. The other policies, if they work, trim emissions and thereby keep the price of permits—though not necessarily the overall cost of reducing emissions—lower than it might otherwise be. Policy analysts argue over the costs and benefits of each complementary policy, but regardless of whether the strategy makes policy sense it definitely made political sense: support for the complementary policies helped to carry along the less-popular carbon price.
15. California voters support AB 32, including the carbon cap.
In 2010, elements of the oil industry aimed a ballot measure at the carbon cap, and the rest of AB 32, by offering voters a chance to suspend them “until unemployment drops to 5.5 percent or less for a full year.” By a whopping 62-38 percent margin, voters declined, affirming their support for a clean-energy transition.
16. The courts have so far approved the cap.
In the courtroom, the news service Marten Law notes that AB 32 “has withstood the many challenges it has faced” (updates here and here). Challenges keep coming, but so far, none of them has damaged the law.
17. California’s cap is designed for others to join; Quebec already did.
California’s cap is connected with Quebec’s, enabling refiners, power generators, and other carbon-market participants in the two jurisdictions to trade carbon allowances and offsets. Joint auctions are in the offing. This link is one of the few remnants of the Western Climate Initiative, which tried in 2007 to create a multi-jurisdictional carbon price in seven states and four provinces.
Picking up where WCI left off, the premier of British Columbia and the governors of California, Oregon and Washington signed an agreement in October of 2013 to launch the Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy. California’s cap anchors its south and BC’s carbon tax anchors its north. Oregon and Washington, sandwiched between them, have two models of carbon pricing to choose from and, perhaps, join. California has even articulated the conditions a jurisdiction must meet to join its cap and trade system (here, here, and here, on page 95). Washington and Oregon policymakers will no doubt be examining these terms closely in the months ahead.
Research assistance by Pablo Arenas. Thanks to reviewers Kristin Eberhard, Anthony Eggert, Elizabeth Hardee, Katie Hsia, Alex Jackson, and Erica Morehouse for comments on a draft of this article.
Sources for figures: Emissions trends in the first figure are from US Census Bureau and California Department of Finance (population); emissions data from California ARB for 1990-2004 and 2000-2011 , with data for 2000-2004 using an average of the (slightly different) figures from these two sources. Emissions include most greenhouse gases, including “carbon by wire” from imported electricity, but not including aviation or boat fuel used for out-of-state travel.
Carbon cap permits in the second figure are from California Air Resources board, assembled and analyzed by Natural Resources Defense Council, San Francisco. To make the chart more readily understood, this chart somewhat simplifies categories of permits.
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Terrific article! Glad to see that someone is leading the way . . .
Nice job explaining the elements of California’s system, and comparing it to other similar systems. I also thought the description of the complementary measures and the context in which they’re viewed was well done. I hope that Washington and Oregon both join; and that we advance the targets for post-2020.
Nice job of not explaining how to get more money from Californian. All these charges to the companies will be passed on to consumers. I will be living California soon……..
Nice piece on California.
#4: ONLY the CPUC is allocating residential allowances “one per meter” and I would have thought you would LIKE that approach — rebating the money NOT in proportion to usage. Very much like a carbon tax that rebates it all on a per-capita basis. That approach applies ONLY to the residential allowances, not to commercial, which get folded into the rates. People are responding as intended: the “climate dividend” is NOT being viewed as a discount on the electric bill.
It actually is a huge wealth transfer from McMansions and desert-area single-family homes to apartment and coast-zone dwellers. Most important, it raises the cost of discretionary usage.
BUT, the municipals are NOT following this model; I think all of them are using their allowances to offset their emissions, in essence allocating them on a per-kWh basis.
Changing to #14: THIS economist LIKES the complementary policies. In particular, building codes, zoning, appliance standards, and fuel economy standards. The New England states put a piece of their carbon allowance revenue into energy efficiency programs. Those programs reduce carbon emissions by more than the fee does — and in fact, the allowance prices have stayed at rock bottom in large part because investment in efficiency helps meet the (not-very-aggressive) New England targets.
The California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard is an important one. They have carefully measured the source carbon content of biofuels, so that corn ethanol refined with coal-fired electricity is essentially a wash with gasoline, and does not count. Same fuel refined with wind electricity does. This is an important distinction from most LCFS proposals. er,
Terrific article covering the essential elements of California’s mechanism nicely done!
Your point, “California actually designed its carbon market so that other states can plug themselves into it,” is a critical one that I feel some overlook. I have heard ARB Chair, Mary Nichols, say pointedly that they will measure their success in CA against the number of jurisdictions they manage to link to.
thank you for this well-researched and written article. I have taken copious notes, and understand cape and trade versus carbon tax so much better now. This new understanding will come in handy when I and 700 other members lobby in Washington with Citizens’ Climate Lobby “for the political will for a livable planet”.
Great job ! (But are you British Colombian ?)
There is one fundamental point you missed. This is not a California alone designed system open for others to simply «plug in». This is a system designed by the WCI partners, especially Calif-Québec-Wash-Ontario-Oregon and BC. At the end most backed off for political reasons (and BC because it has its succesful carbon tax). But the important result is that at the end, two leader jurisdictions, Calif and Québec, are setting up what is still bounded to be the base of a truly North-American carbon market.
Quebec didn’t just pluged in to California system. Quebec develop it own C&T system, as comprehensive and rigourous as California’s (at least your link open a California doc that demonstrate that). Then Québec and California linked their systems on the bases that are in the WCI Program Design (westernclimateinitiative/component/remository/general/program-design/Design-Summary-And-Documentation). They will have in november their first Calif-Quebec common auction of allowances. Now it is dearly hoped that other dynamic jurisdictions, like BC-Wash-Ontario and others, will also set up their own rigourous C&T system and do what’s needed to link with California and Québec.
Avec mes meilleures salutations.
Benoit St-Jean, BAA, ACI, LL. M.(environment)
Advisor in international commerce and sustainable development.
This whole carbon credit/cap is utter nonsense! In reality they are still allowing the companies or business to pollute. (Sometime above establish levels) And exactly where does the money go? To help clean the air/environment?? NÃO! The money most likely goes to a general fund where the likes of the State Legislators who continue to spend beyond their intake of revenue, try to pay off unfunded pensions and liabilities the State owes. This is nothing more then another tax in which the people of California are once again getting screwed. Like the gas tax which is suppose to go for the roads and infrastructure….It ends up going to fund over committed pensions while the roads (have you driven on CA. roads lately) are in dire need of repair with no real funding in sight. I am one of the biggest supporters for a clean planet, but I don’t believe in lying to people and taxing the poor to pay for what the rich create.
First, I must say that I appreciate the fine effort you made to describe the overly complex California cap and trade market rules in easy-to-understand language. That is vert hard to do.
Having said that, the article includes a number of important errors and omissions, one of which Jim Lamar highlights above.
Please note that, contrary to suggestions in the article, CalifoCalifornia’s carbon market rules unfairly discriminate against states and provinces with which California trades. That is why none of BC, WA, OR or other US states that trade with CA have elected to link CA’s carbon policies/markets, notwithstanding the significant resources they expended on the WCI process. And the only province/state that has linked to CA does not trade (much) with CA. There are reasons these statements are true, and they should be of great concern to those of us who care about the adoption of effective, efficient and sustainable carbon policy(ies).
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17 Things to Know About California’s Carbon Cap.
The Golden (State's) rules.
While Cascadian climate hawks have been fighting rearguard actions against proposed pipelines and coal trains, California has been rolling out an ambitious carbon cap. Such a cap is the principal alternative to a carbon tax—such as British Columbia’s carbon tax shift—as a method for putting a price on carbon in Oregon and Washington. It’s an option Oregon will consider next year in its impending revenue-reform debate. In Washington, the Golden State’s cap appears to be the model that Governor Jay Inslee favors: he recently convened a panel of leaders to design a state “Cap and Market” system.
The panel, after deliberation, may conclude that the best choice is for Washington to simply photocopy California’s rules and join the Golden State’s system. California actually designed its carbon market so that other states can plug themselves into it. Or the panel could opt to design its own system. Either way, Cascadia’s climate warriors would do well to study how their southern neighbor put a price on carbon, because the Golden State’s rules form the dominant carbon trading market in North America. Just last week, the state auctioned more than 20 million carbon-emission permits at $11.50 apiece.
Here are 17 things worth knowing about that market. Some of them are details, even arcane ones, but the details of a carbon pricing system matter enormously. They matter more than whether the underlying mechanism is a tax or a cap. (Sightline laid out the details of good design in Cap and Trade 101.)
1. The cap is strong . . . until 2020.
California’s carbon cap—the flagship in an armada of global warming policies launched in 2006 as Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32)—came into force in January of 2013, initially covering the electric-power sector and large factories with giant carbon footprints. Next year, it expands to the carbon dioxide from gasoline, diesel, natural gas, and other fossil fuels (and to other greenhouse gases such as methane). By then, the Cali cap will be the most comprehensive, though not the most aggressive, carbon-pricing regime in the world.
The crux of cap-and-trade is the cap itself: a legally enforceable limit on total climate-altering pollution. The cap diminishes over time, gradually squeezing carbon out of the economy.
The Air Resources Board, a branch of the California Environmental Protection Agency, designed and enforces the cap. ARB issues one permit for each ton of carbon dioxide emissions allowed each year. Once the cap is fully phased in next year, just about everyone who sells fossil fuels or fossil-fuel-powered electricity into the California economy will have to obtain enough permits to cover the emissions from their fuel or electricity.
The total supply of emissions permits will step downward by 2-3 percent per year for the rest of this decade so that emissions return to the 1990 level by 2020. After 2020, the same annual cap will likely apply, but as of yet, the legislature has not told ARB to ratchet down permits further. The state is under a non-binding executive order to reduce emissions an additional 80 percent by 2050, and the legislature has begun debating a continued downward trajectory of permits. But the program’s future depends on whether climate hawks retain sufficient influence in Sacramento.
2. Is it working? Por enquanto, tudo bem.
California’s cap is new, so it’s too soon to make unequivocal statements about its effectiveness. Complete emissions data from the Golden State are only available through 2011—two years before the launch of the cap. So far, though, ARB’s systems of rules and enforcement mechanisms seem well crafted and appear to be functioning as intended. Barring some unforeseen political change, we expect they will trim emissions as intended through 2020.
Overall, the state’s emissions (shown below) rose from 1996 to 2007, then dropped with the Great Recession and have since plateaued. To return to 1990 levels by 2020 will require a 5 percent drop below the 2011 level. Because California’s population continues growing quickly, emissions per capita will have to drop even more, as the figure shows. (Sources for the figure are at the end of the article.)
Original Sightline Institute graphic, available under our Free Use Policy.
3. Most of the dollar value of the permits will benefit the public.
The “trade” in cap-and-trade means that the companies regulated under the cap can sell their emissions permits if they have more than they need or buy permits from others if they’re short. These emissions permits are like shares of stock or commodities such as pork bellies: their value varies and you can sell them for cash.
Many cap-and-trade systems distribute emissions permits for free—an approach Sightline has long criticized as regressive and a reward to dirty industries. Sightline, like most policy analysts, prefers auctioning permits, so that the public retains their full value and can invest it in public purposes, such as buffering low-income families against higher energy prices.
Next year, when the cap expands, ARB will auction most of the new permits—those for petroleum and other fuels. That’s great news, and it will account for about half of all permits in the years ahead. As for the rest of the system—the permits covering electricity, large factories, and other sources of greenhouse gases—well, it’s complicated. But the bottom line is that, even though ARB has been distributing about 90 percent of emissions permits for free in 2013 and 2014, it’s devised policies that are hard to criticize too harshly. By our estimation, most of the dollar value associated with the permits will either be captured in the auction or be allocated in a way that provides at least indirect benefits to the public.
First, ARB is not grandfathering permits—distributing free permits to large industrial facilities based on their past emissions. Instead, it has devised a formula that provides free permits (shown in blue in the figure below) to large industrial companies whose products compete head-to-head with products from outside of California. The goal is to prevent putting California industries that sell into out-of-state markets at a disadvantage. The formula goes further and gives extra permits to the firms that have done the most to reduce their emissions. It’s not a perfect policy. It still siphons money to the state’s biggest carbon polluters, and no formula can capture all the nuances of market competition. Still, it’s not grandfathering.
Second, ARB is distributing most of its free permits to electric utilities (orange in the figure below) and, starting next year, to natural gas utilities (yellow, below). The utilities get the permits for free, but the California Public Utility Commission requires all investor-owned utilities to sell their permits in ARB’s auction. Of course, the utilities then need to buy permits to cover their own emissions. The point of this Rube Goldberg device is to determine the dollar value of the permits: the CPUC orders utilities to devote all of the proceeds from the sales of their permits for the exclusive benefit of their retail customers.
For example, the CPUC ordered Pacific Gas and Electric, the giant private utility that serves much of northern California, to give “climate credits” averaging $35 to residential customers as line items on their April bills. It will do so again in October. That’s enough money to offset the pocketbook bite of carbon pricing—the increased price of PG&E electricity—for many customers, especially low-income households. Because the credits come as a flat amount that is the same regardless of how much power a household uses, they don’t diminish the economic incentive to reduce emissions. And they counter the regressive nature of carbon pricing: poor families get the same credit as rich families, although poor families use far fewer kilowatt-hours. In effect, California has hacked together a crude cap-and-dividend system through its utilities.
Climate credits are progressive in another way as well. California offers discounted power rates and energy-saving services for qualifying low-income families, further trimming their bills. Climate credits consequently stretch further.
Original Sightline Institute graphic, available under our Free Use Policy.
4. The cap will hurt working families some, despite Cali’s best efforts.
California chose to take imperfect action and address regressivity through policies like utility credits. These credits are a blunt instrument for sharing carbon-pricing revenue. They allocate credits one per electric meter, whether the meter serves one person or eight. A better policy would distribute climate credits through refundable state income tax credits and the electronic benefit transfer system. The tax and benefit systems have the subtlety and comprehensiveness to distribute climate credits to those who need them most.
Californian climate hawks had bold plans for just such low-income rebates, one advocate told us. Unfortunately, she said, “The lawyers came in and shut down the party.” Legal and political constraints made rebates impossible. In California, new taxes must win supermajority support in the state legislature, while state agencies can impose fees authorized by simple majorities. AB 32 passed by simple majority in 2006, granting power to ARB to establish cap and trade. To defend the system against lawsuits arguing that cap and trade is an unauthorized tax, ARB must collect and spend auction revenue in conformity with legal definitions of a fee.
To qualify as a fee, a revenue stream has to pass a set of legal tests, among which is that the fee pays for programs closely aligned with the fee itself. Tax revenue can be spent on whatever the legislature chooses; fee revenue can only flow to programs that advance the purpose of the fee. A tax can pay for schools or police or state parks and anything else the legislature chooses, but a garbage-collection fee must pay for garbage collection.
In the case of cap and trade, the purpose of the program is to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, so California’s auction revenues must fund emissions-reduction programs. Distributing the proceeds as rebates to poor families or as dividends for all Californians would be to treat auction revenue as a tax. The whole cap-and-trade program might then be vulnerable to a lawsuit.
Utilities are regulated private companies, not public entities, so the closest California could come to rebates for working families was its utility hack: free permits, mandatory auctions, mandatory “climate credits.” For the poorest families, who consume little power and pay discounted rates, these credits provide a net gain: their value is far greater than costs these families will see as a result of the higher power prices associated with the carbon cap in the electricity and industrial sectors.
That’s good news, because, next year, when the auction expands to petroleum and more, household costs are likely to begin rising more and the state has only weak tools—two of them—for further buffering the poor.
First, economy-wide energy efficiency standards and investments paid for with cap revenue will help trim the energy consumption of California households. They’ll have more efficient appliances, vehicles, and homes, and, for some, energy consumption may decline more than prices rise.
Second, California has committed that at least 10 percent of auction funds will go to clean-energy and climate-protection programs in neighborhoods where disadvantaged people are disproportionately represented. It also requires that 25 percent of auction proceeds go to projects that particularly help disadvantaged communities in some way.
Project-by-project investments in building retrofits, better transit, and other green infrastructure—no matter how desirable they may be—cannot buffer all working families from the pocket-book effects of putting a price on carbon. But they’ll buffer many families.
California’s cap is distorted by the supermajority voting requirement in the state constitution. Oregon has a similar, though less extreme, supermajority rule for new revenue. Washington, however, does not. The Evergreen State may therefore be able to do better by its working families in its carbon pricing system than California does.
5. California may soon get more than $1 billion a year from its carbon auction.
Look at the olive area that dominates the chart above. That area mostly represents permits for transportation fuels. Starting next year, the state will begin auctioning these permits and placing the revenues in a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund.
How much revenue will come into the fund depends on the auction price of permits, of course, but it’s likely to exceed half a billion dollars in the next fiscal year. That figure could increase to as much as $2 billion a year for the rest of the decade or roughly $50 a year for each of the state’s 38 million residents.
The state is supposed to invest these funds in programs that reduce carbon pollution. The state’s investment plan sketches expenditures in sustainable infrastructure, energy efficiency upgrades, natural resource conservation, solid-waste reduction and recycling, and low-carbon transportation systems. Governor Jerry Brown has proposed dedicating $250 million in 2014 to the controversial high-speed rail line in development between Los Angeles and San Francisco.
Whether the Golden State will do a good job of managing its carbon auction proceeds is a great, unanswerable question. O tempo vai dizer.
6. The scope is almost comprehensive.
By the end of 2015, the Cali cap will cover 85 percent of California’s greenhouse gas emissions, including non-fossil-fuel emissions of carbon from cement manufacturing and “minor greenhouse gases” such as methane. It even includes “carbon by wire,” that is, the emissions from out-of-state coal and natural gas plants that sell electricity into the state’s grid. Following what appears to be a standard adaptation of IPCC measurement rules, however, California does not include in its emissions inventory—or in its carbon pricing policies—fuel used to power planes or ships with destinations beyond the state border.
For comparison, the BC carbon tax covers only fossil fuels burned inside the province; it does not include carbon by wire or fuel used by planes or ships leaving the province. Altogether, the BC carbon tax shift encompasses about 70 percent of provincial greenhouse gas emissions. The Northeast states’ Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) covers only electricity, and not carbon by wire. The European cap-and-trade system covers electricity and industry but not motor fuels. California’s program, although its current carbon price is lower than that in British Columbia and some European carbon taxes, will soon be the most comprehensive in the world. And as the cap gets tighter it may gain depth to go along with its breadth.
7. The cap requires zero paperwork from most Californians.
Any carbon price has to actually attach to fossil fuels at specific, physical locations. ARB made life easy for itself by choosing locations that would limit the number of companies it would need to regulate: in the entire state, only an estimated 350 businesses have legal obligations under the cap. Some of these companies’ 600-or-so regulated facilities are “upstream,” such as power plants, while others are “midstream,” such as wholesale petroleum distribution centers, but all of them are convenient chokepoints in the fossil fuel economy. In short, most Californians will see the impacts of carbon pricing in their fuel bills—and in the funding it produces for clean-energy solutions and utility rebates—but they’ll never fill out of a form.
8. The cap smartly allows “banking,” not “borrowing.”
The Cali rules allow regulated entities to save permits issued this year for use in a future year (banking) but not to borrow permits from future years to use now (borrowing). California’s permits have a “vintage year” and can be used at any point during or after that year. This is good policy, as it adds flexibility for participants and stabilizes permit prices without blowing a hole in the cap.
9. Trading is tightly regulated, as it should be.
The first permit auction took place in November of 2012, and it and subsequent auctions have gone smoothly. Any individuals or entities that register can participate in the trading of permits, which is good thing for the smooth functioning of the carbon market. ARB has also introduced a variety of market monitoring efforts. For example, the state enforces limits on how many permits one may hold and disclosure rules require that the authorities know who owns each permit at any point in time. Such policies provide safeguards against market manipulation and fraud of the type recently documented in Wall Street high-frequency trading and “dark pools.” Gaming of this type is unlikely in any event, as Sightline has argued, but ARB is not taking chances.
10. California carefully restricts and monitors offsets.
California allows regulated facilities to substitute qualifying offsets—such as reforestation programs and methane captured from livestock manure digesters—for 8 percent of their emissions permits. Critics have argued that California’s offset provisions are far too generous, endangering the integrity of the cap. Early offsets in the European cap-and-trade program sometimes proved dubious as to their true net effect on global carbon pollution.
We’ll have to wait and see the effect of California’s offsets, but ARB’s regulations suggest that the agency is taking an appropriately hard line. Its offset restrictions may be the toughest in any cap-and-trade system. All offsets must be third-party verified, sited within the United States, provably “additional” to what would have otherwise happened, and from within only five categories so far. The limited availability of offsets that pass those tests may prevent offsets from meeting anywhere close to their theoretical maximum of 8 percent of permits per regulated facility.
11. California’s cap folds in the climate benefits of a carbon tax.
On May 16, ARB auctioned almost 17 million one-ton carbon permits for $11.50 each, plus another 4 million that will not be valid until 2017, for $11.34 each. Between auctions, permits trade on private markets. Their price has trended downward (see page 12) as more auctions have taken place, revealing that emissions reductions are perhaps easier to come by than previously expected. That price translates, very roughly, to 1 cent per kWh of coal-fired power or a dime per gallon of gasoline (except that gasoline doesn’t come under the cap until 2015). In comparison, the BC carbon tax started at $10 per metric ton of CO 2 in 2008 and increased to $30 per ton (US$27.50) in 2012, where it has remained.
The February auction price was just above the reserve price—the minimum bid allowed. The reserve price started at $10 per ton in 2012 and goes up annually by 5 percent plus inflation. This escalating reserve price accelerates emissions reductions if they prove inexpensive. It establishes a predictable floor beneath which the carbon price will not fall, and that price floor tells the entire energy economy that cheap carbon is forever gone, just as a carbon tax would. The inflation-adjusted price of carbon will be no lower than $15 a ton in 2020. By 2031, assuming extension of the program, the floor price will be above $25.
12. California’s “reserve” could speed the transition beyond carbon.
Some cap-and-trade systems set top prices called “pressure valves” that threaten to blow holes in the cap by allowing waivers and exemptions. California’s does not. Instead, it has a “price containment reserve” (shown in red in the figure above). ARB holds back a few percent of permits from each auction and deposits them in the reserve. If carbon prices rise across a high trigger, some of these permits go to auction, helping to tame prices. This reservoir of permits not only serves as a shock absorber against price spikes, it also tightens the cap in regular years. ARB projects that permit prices will stay below the trigger price; if that happens, the state will actually end up below 1990 levels in 2020.
13. The governor can put the cap on hold.
Less admirable about this policy is a poison pill buried in AB 32. To win passage, proponents of the bill had to include a provision that allows the governor to suspend the program for a year in case of “extraordinary circumstances, catastrophic events, or threat of significant economic harm”—terms that a science-denying future governor might exploit for political purposes. Indeed, gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman pledged to do so in her race against Jerry Brown. The governor cannot suspend the state’s income tax or speeding laws in any circumstances. Why should she or he have unilateral authority to suspend its carbon cap?
14. The cap is only part of California’s approach.
California’s carbon cap is only one facet of AB 32. It’s a critical one—the backstop and guarantor of all the others—but it’s not alone.
In fact, by some measures, the cap is not even the main event. The latest ARB estimate suggests that 80 percent of the promised emissions reductions will come from “complementary policies” such as a Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Advanced Clean Car Standards, and a Renewable Electricity Standard. The cap-and-trade program “cleans up the rest.”
Economists tend to dislike this type of complementarity. The philosophy of cap-and-trade is for the market, not public agencies, to choose how to tame carbon pollution. On the other hand, energy markets are riddled with flaws and oddities (such as payback gaps, split incentives, and other principal-agent problems), so the traditional arguments for relying entirely on market incentives are not bullet-proof. Ultimately, it’s a battle between market failure and government failure.
California’s approach—for better or worse—is to wear both belt and suspenders: put a price on carbon but also implement regulatory policies in an effort to fix market failures. The other policies, if they work, trim emissions and thereby keep the price of permits—though not necessarily the overall cost of reducing emissions—lower than it might otherwise be. Policy analysts argue over the costs and benefits of each complementary policy, but regardless of whether the strategy makes policy sense it definitely made political sense: support for the complementary policies helped to carry along the less-popular carbon price.
15. California voters support AB 32, including the carbon cap.
In 2010, elements of the oil industry aimed a ballot measure at the carbon cap, and the rest of AB 32, by offering voters a chance to suspend them “until unemployment drops to 5.5 percent or less for a full year.” By a whopping 62-38 percent margin, voters declined, affirming their support for a clean-energy transition.
16. The courts have so far approved the cap.
In the courtroom, the news service Marten Law notes that AB 32 “has withstood the many challenges it has faced” (updates here and here). Challenges keep coming, but so far, none of them has damaged the law.
17. California’s cap is designed for others to join; Quebec already did.
California’s cap is connected with Quebec’s, enabling refiners, power generators, and other carbon-market participants in the two jurisdictions to trade carbon allowances and offsets. Joint auctions are in the offing. This link is one of the few remnants of the Western Climate Initiative, which tried in 2007 to create a multi-jurisdictional carbon price in seven states and four provinces.
Picking up where WCI left off, the premier of British Columbia and the governors of California, Oregon and Washington signed an agreement in October of 2013 to launch the Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy. California’s cap anchors its south and BC’s carbon tax anchors its north. Oregon and Washington, sandwiched between them, have two models of carbon pricing to choose from and, perhaps, join. California has even articulated the conditions a jurisdiction must meet to join its cap and trade system (here, here, and here, on page 95). Washington and Oregon policymakers will no doubt be examining these terms closely in the months ahead.
Research assistance by Pablo Arenas. Thanks to reviewers Kristin Eberhard, Anthony Eggert, Elizabeth Hardee, Katie Hsia, Alex Jackson, and Erica Morehouse for comments on a draft of this article.
Sources for figures: Emissions trends in the first figure are from US Census Bureau and California Department of Finance (population); emissions data from California ARB for 1990-2004 and 2000-2011 , with data for 2000-2004 using an average of the (slightly different) figures from these two sources. Emissions include most greenhouse gases, including “carbon by wire” from imported electricity, but not including aviation or boat fuel used for out-of-state travel.
Carbon cap permits in the second figure are from California Air Resources board, assembled and analyzed by Natural Resources Defense Council, San Francisco. To make the chart more readily understood, this chart somewhat simplifies categories of permits.
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Terrific article! Glad to see that someone is leading the way . . .
Nice job explaining the elements of California’s system, and comparing it to other similar systems. I also thought the description of the complementary measures and the context in which they’re viewed was well done. I hope that Washington and Oregon both join; and that we advance the targets for post-2020.
Nice job of not explaining how to get more money from Californian. All these charges to the companies will be passed on to consumers. I will be living California soon……..
Nice piece on California.
#4: ONLY the CPUC is allocating residential allowances “one per meter” and I would have thought you would LIKE that approach — rebating the money NOT in proportion to usage. Very much like a carbon tax that rebates it all on a per-capita basis. That approach applies ONLY to the residential allowances, not to commercial, which get folded into the rates. People are responding as intended: the “climate dividend” is NOT being viewed as a discount on the electric bill.
It actually is a huge wealth transfer from McMansions and desert-area single-family homes to apartment and coast-zone dwellers. Most important, it raises the cost of discretionary usage.
BUT, the municipals are NOT following this model; I think all of them are using their allowances to offset their emissions, in essence allocating them on a per-kWh basis.
Changing to #14: THIS economist LIKES the complementary policies. In particular, building codes, zoning, appliance standards, and fuel economy standards. The New England states put a piece of their carbon allowance revenue into energy efficiency programs. Those programs reduce carbon emissions by more than the fee does — and in fact, the allowance prices have stayed at rock bottom in large part because investment in efficiency helps meet the (not-very-aggressive) New England targets.
The California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard is an important one. They have carefully measured the source carbon content of biofuels, so that corn ethanol refined with coal-fired electricity is essentially a wash with gasoline, and does not count. Same fuel refined with wind electricity does. This is an important distinction from most LCFS proposals. er,
Terrific article covering the essential elements of California’s mechanism nicely done!
Your point, “California actually designed its carbon market so that other states can plug themselves into it,” is a critical one that I feel some overlook. I have heard ARB Chair, Mary Nichols, say pointedly that they will measure their success in CA against the number of jurisdictions they manage to link to.
thank you for this well-researched and written article. I have taken copious notes, and understand cape and trade versus carbon tax so much better now. This new understanding will come in handy when I and 700 other members lobby in Washington with Citizens’ Climate Lobby “for the political will for a livable planet”.
Great job ! (But are you British Colombian ?)
There is one fundamental point you missed. This is not a California alone designed system open for others to simply «plug in». This is a system designed by the WCI partners, especially Calif-Québec-Wash-Ontario-Oregon and BC. At the end most backed off for political reasons (and BC because it has its succesful carbon tax). But the important result is that at the end, two leader jurisdictions, Calif and Québec, are setting up what is still bounded to be the base of a truly North-American carbon market.
Quebec didn’t just pluged in to California system. Quebec develop it own C&T system, as comprehensive and rigourous as California’s (at least your link open a California doc that demonstrate that). Then Québec and California linked their systems on the bases that are in the WCI Program Design (westernclimateinitiative/component/remository/general/program-design/Design-Summary-And-Documentation). They will have in november their first Calif-Quebec common auction of allowances. Now it is dearly hoped that other dynamic jurisdictions, like BC-Wash-Ontario and others, will also set up their own rigourous C&T system and do what’s needed to link with California and Québec.
Avec mes meilleures salutations.
Benoit St-Jean, BAA, ACI, LL. M.(environment)
Advisor in international commerce and sustainable development.
This whole carbon credit/cap is utter nonsense! In reality they are still allowing the companies or business to pollute. (Sometime above establish levels) And exactly where does the money go? To help clean the air/environment?? NÃO! The money most likely goes to a general fund where the likes of the State Legislators who continue to spend beyond their intake of revenue, try to pay off unfunded pensions and liabilities the State owes. This is nothing more then another tax in which the people of California are once again getting screwed. Like the gas tax which is suppose to go for the roads and infrastructure….It ends up going to fund over committed pensions while the roads (have you driven on CA. roads lately) are in dire need of repair with no real funding in sight. I am one of the biggest supporters for a clean planet, but I don’t believe in lying to people and taxing the poor to pay for what the rich create.
First, I must say that I appreciate the fine effort you made to describe the overly complex California cap and trade market rules in easy-to-understand language. That is vert hard to do.
Having said that, the article includes a number of important errors and omissions, one of which Jim Lamar highlights above.
Please note that, contrary to suggestions in the article, CalifoCalifornia’s carbon market rules unfairly discriminate against states and provinces with which California trades. That is why none of BC, WA, OR or other US states that trade with CA have elected to link CA’s carbon policies/markets, notwithstanding the significant resources they expended on the WCI process. And the only province/state that has linked to CA does not trade (much) with CA. There are reasons these statements are true, and they should be of great concern to those of us who care about the adoption of effective, efficient and sustainable carbon policy(ies).
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Other training establishments.
Educação e treinamento.
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) prides itself in providing members with the best knowledge and skills necessary to get the job done and to develop professionally.
Continuing education, life-long learning and development, are part of modern CAF life. Constantly improving occupational knowledge and skills builds a professional military.
At the centre of advanced and specialized training is the system of Canadian Armed Forces training establishments. These institutions have a long history, some going back 100 years, of training young soldiers, sailors, air men and women.
Here is a list of the most significant CAF training establishments:
Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, QC. The Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School conducts basic training for officers and non-commissioned members joining the Regular Force component of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The School is also responsible of professional development programmes for officers and non-commissioned members. Every year, more than 4000 people start their military career at CFLRS, while 5000 military members train via Distance Learning.
Borden, ON. The Canadian Forces Chaplain School and Centre trains all chaplains (Regular and Reserve, from different faith groups) who provide ministry to CAF personnel and their families. CFCHSC provides training in operational and static ministry, preparing military chaplains for service in times of peace as well as during times of conflict.
Located in Canadian Forces Base Borden, Ontario. The Canadian Forces Fire and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Academy is the national Centre of Excellence and the primary source for joint advanced individual training in the areas of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence, Nuclear Emergency Response, Radiation Safety and Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear Counter Terrorism response and provides the training to the Fire Service for the Department of National Defence.
The Fire Service Curriculum provides a very diverse selection of career path and specialized training in the areas of Fire Prevention, Aircraft Rescue Fire Fighting, Structural Fire Fighting, Fire Investigation, Rescue and Respiratory Protection Programme Administration.
School’s reputation for being subject matter experts in the fields of Fire Fighting and Hazardous Materials Incident training has allowed it to market its training to some 20 agencies throughout the world.
Borden, ON. Each year, the Canadian Forces Logistic Training Centre trains approximately 3,000 military members (both Regular Force and Reserves) and civilians. The CFLTC provides entry level training to Logistics Officers from all three environments (Navy/Army/Air Forces) such as Supply, Music and Explosives Training Cadres, of Resource Management Support, Food Services, Transportation & Traffic Training Cadres, and oversees Officer and Advanced Training. In addition, the CFLTC also trains sub occupations for Logistics Officers in the Supply Chain Management, Financial Management, Human Resources Management, Fleet Management and Food Services.
The CFLTC trains the non-commissioned members’ occupations of: Resource Management Support Clerk, Cook, Steward, Supply Technician, Ammunition Technician, Traffic Technician, Mobile Support Equipment Operator, and Musician.
Borden, ON. The Canadian Forces Training Development Centre is the Centre of Excellence for instructional methods and training development; e-Learning development services; and training development support to the CAF. CFTDC is active in the evaluation, research and development of training methods and technologies and also provides advice and guidance on instructional design and delivery of training to Canadian Armed Forces training establishments across the country.
Kingston, ON. The Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence is the Canadian Armed Forces centre of excellence for intelligence training. It delivers core and specialist military intelligence training from basic through advanced levels to officers and Non-Commissioned Members within the Canadian Armed Forces and civilians within the Department of National Defence.
Winnipeg, Manitoba. The Canadian Forces School of Meteorology is the CAF training establishment for CAF Meteorological Technicians. CFS Met provides basic and advanced courses in meteorology for Meteorology Technicians.
Courses offered include: Basic Occupation Qualification, Basic Weather Observer and briefer, Marine Weather Observer, and Specialized Weather Support.
CACSC delivers high quality, relevant and progressive education and training in order to prepare Army officers for employment in command and staff positions at the tactical level.
The The Peace Support Training Centre is a Joint, Inter-agency, and Multinational training establishment located in Kingston, Ontario. The PSTC supports the intellectual development and training of Canadian Forces, members from other government departments, and international audiences. The PSTC’s activities fall into two overall lines of operation: delivering training and fulfilling centre of excellence responsibilities.
The Armour School conducts basic and advanced qualifications courses, as well as advanced leadership qualifications and basic armour officer requirements and specialized qualifications.
The Artillery School conducts artillery advanced qualifications, advanced artillery leadership qualifications, as well as basic artillery officer requirements and specialized qualifications.
The Infantry School’s mission is to conduct the Infantry Corps advanced infantry qualifications, advanced Senior NCM leadership qualifications, basic infantry officer training and pertinent specialized all-arms qualifications for the Canadian Armed Forces.
The Tactics School develops, teaches, and monitors combined arms operations, focussing on tactics, techniques, and procedures at the combat team level within a battle group. The school's mission is to educate and train junior Army officers in the integration of combat functions at the combat team level on the tactical battlefield.
The Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics, Kingston, ON, has remained at the leading edge of communications and electronics training since 1937, first in the Canadian Army and now in the Canadian Armed Forces. The CFSCE provides basic, intermediate and advanced training to military personnel in communications and electronics.
The Canadian Forces Military Police Academy, Borden, ON, provides career and specialist training to Regular and Reserve Force members of the Military Police Branch and security-related training to non-Branch personnel. The CFMPA also provides training to personnel from other government and law enforcement agencies and to foreign nationals under the Military Training Assistance Program.
The Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering, CFB Gagetown, NB, is the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) centre of excellence in engineer training and home of the engineers. It conducts 85 different courses that span all ranks and occupations within the field, construction and airfield engineer organizations.
Saint-Jean-Sur-Richelieu, Ottawa and Borden. For nearly 50 years, the Canadian Forces Language Schools have been providing language training for military personnel across Canada and abroad, adapting their services in response to the changing needs of the CAF.
The Canadian Forces Medical Services School / Canadian Forces Dental Services School is the centre of excellence for all Canadian Armed Forces Health Services Group trades training for officers and non-commissioned members of the Regular and Reserve Force Medical and Dental Services.
Trenton, Ontario. Formerly the Canadian Parachute Centre, the Canadian Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre has evolved into a centre of excellence for winter, desert and jungle warfare, as well as amphibious warfare. It remains the Canadian Armed Forces' centre of excellence for parachuting and the Army's centre of excellence for aerial delivery, helicopter and mountain operations.
Borden, ON. The Canadian Forces School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering conducts individual and specialized training for Electrical and Mechanical Engineering officers, as well as vehicle, weapons, fire control systems and material technicians. The CFSEME conducts training for both the Regular and Reserve forces. The school offers 54 different technical courses and trains approximately 900 students a year.
Located in Gatineau, Quebec, the Defence Public Affairs Learning Centre (DPALC) provides Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel with specialized, structured and bilingual military public affairs and communications training. Through its innovative in-house, mobile and distance learning packages, the DPALC trains approximately 750 students per year, including Regular and Reserve Force Public Affairs Officers, CAF Imagery Technicians, military and civilian DND/CAF spokespeople and members other militaries.
The DPALC’s mission is to develop a cadre of professional Public Affairs Officers in the CAF, and to give defence personnel, especially CAF members, the training and expertise they need to connect effectively with Canadians and provide communications advice to senior leaders.